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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has paid a significant amount of attention to
federal subject matter jurisdiction in the last few terms.' Commentators have followed the Court's lead with a flood of articles discussing
the merits of the Court's jurisdictional rulings and extending the law
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Law clerk to the Honorable John D. Rainey, District Judge, Southern District of
Texas, Victoria Division. Many thanks to Professor Margaret Lemos for extraordinary guidance on this project.
1. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Empire Healthchoice Assurance,
Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006); Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006);
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443
(2004).
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to areas the Court has not (yet) reached. 2 The debate has touched on
fairness, history, and the institutional roles of the courts and the
legislature.
Oddly missing from the entire discussion has been the Constitution. This is understandable because jurisdictional issues are usually
presented as statutory questions: Congress has the power to determine how much jurisdiction to actually grant to the federal courts, up
to the jurisdictional ceiling created by Article III. So whether a federal court has jurisdiction is often a question of whether Congress has
granted jurisdiction, rather than whether the Constitution permits
Congress to do so. The constitutional ceiling lurks in the background
of jurisdictional questions, yet it has been ignored in the recent de3
bates about subject-matter jurisdiction.
This Article aims to fill this gap in the debate by re-examining the
constitutional constraints. I argue that structural limitations on the
extent of congressional power should be treated as limitations on the
scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under the clause of Article III
that grants courts the power to hear cases "arising under... the Laws
of the United States." 4 In other words, I show that the powers exercised by these coequal branches of government are coextensive. While
this thesis may sound quite natural, the federal courts have apparently not thought it to be true.
An instructive case is United States v. Reasor.5 The defendant was
accused of forging securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a). 6 That
2. See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Is Citizen Suit Notice Jurisdictionaland Why Does it
Matter?, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 49 (2003); Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on
Jurisdictionality,The Legal Imagination, and Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 164 (2008); Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionalityand Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2007); Katherine Florey, Insufficiently
Jurisdictional:The Case Against Treating Sovereign Immunity as an Article III
Doctrine, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1375 (2004); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdictionand
Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 (2005); Alex Lees, Note, The JurisdictionalLabel:
Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457 (2006); Brian W. Portugal, Comment,
More Than a Legal Nicety: Why the Forum Defendant Rule of 28 U.S.C. Section
1441(b) is Jurisdictional,56 BAYLOR L. REV. 1019 (2004).
3. The clause of Article III at issue in these cases (though often implicitly) is that
giving the federal courts power to hear "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under th[e] Constitution [and] the laws of the United States." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. "Arising under" (or "federal question") jurisdiction is where most of the
action takes place in the federal courts. From September 30, 2006, to September
30, 2007, 139,424 federal question cases were filed, out of 257,507, or 54.1%.
James C. Duff, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2007 Annual Report of the Director, available at http://uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/C02
Sep07.pdf. "Arising under" jurisdiction is also where courts and commentators
have gone off the rails, failing to recognize the background constitutional issues.
4. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
5. 418 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2005).
6. Id. at 468.
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statute contains a requirement that the forged security be of "a legal
entity ... which operates in or the activities of which affect interstate
or foreign commerce." 7 The defendant urged that because the commerce requirement was not met in her case, the district court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction.8 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circut rejected this argument, stating that jurisdiction
was granted by 18 U.S.C. § 3231-the general federal criminal jurisdiction statute-and thus the court had jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals then made what I argue here was a key misstep: "[T]he
Commerce Clause, found in Article I of the United States Constitution, implies limits on the power of Congress to regulate, not on the
Article III federal courts' power to adjudicate."O
This understanding of the Constitution's federalism limitations on
Congress is incorrect. Article I and Article III are intimately related,
in particular through the statutory portion of the "arising under"
power mentioned above; the federal courts' power under this clause is
parasitic on Congress's power. That is, the courts cannot act under
this grant of jurisdiction where Congress has not legislated."i Further, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 12 says that courts cannot act
where Congress cannot legislate.1 3 Erie relied on an understanding of
federalism that belies the Reasor court's statement that federalism
limits do not apply to the federal courts. Part II of this Article is the
main argument: Erie was, and still is, based on federalism concerns
and that those concerns apply to rein in the power of not just Congress
but also the federal courts.
Having established that federalism limits apply to the federal
courts, the Article turns to practicalities: what real effect on the legal
system should this understanding have? I argue in Part III that to
best effectuate federalism limits on the federal courts, issues raising
federalism questions must be treated as jurisdictional. That is, courts
should treat these challenges as limits on their subject matter jurisdiction, and thus accord those challenges the treatment given other
jurisdictional issues: challenges to jurisdiction cannot be waived, they
can be raised at any time in the judicial process, and the federal courts
themselves can and must raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

18 U.S.C. § 513(c)(4).
Reasor, 418 F.3d at 468-69.
Id. at 469.
Id.
This is true as applied to the statutory portion of the "arising under" grant, not
the constitutional portion. Courts of course can and do hear cases arising under
the Constitution without any congressional legislation.
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. Erie was a diversity jurisdiction case, not one involving the "arising under" grant,
but I argue in section II.B infra that the same rule applies in statutory cases as in
common-law cases.
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Finally, Part IV disposes of what seem to be the most likely
counterarguments to this position.
II.

FEDERALISM LIMITS APPLY TO THE FEDERAL COURTS

The basic contention in this Part is that federalism-based limitations on congressional power also act as limitations on the power of
the federal courts. In other words, Article I of the Constitution is coextensive with Article III's "arising under" power. If Congress can regulate in an area, then it can give the courts the power to decide cases in
that area; but if Congress cannot regulate in that area, then the courts
cannot exercise jurisdiction over those cases.
The first section will show how Erie demands that the federal
courts respect the Constitution's federalism constraints. Of course,
Erie was a case about federal common law. The paradigmatic case for
the issues addressed here, however, is one based on a federal statutory
cause of action.14 Thus, section II.B explicitly shows why relying on
Erie is valid even in this statutory context.
Finally, section II.C gives three additional reasons why my thesis
holds: the Supreme Court's holistic reading of the admiralty power;
the lack of political safeguards of federalism in the judiciary; and the
implausibility of obviating congressional overrides of federal court
lawmaking.
A.

Erie

The Supreme Court's decision in Erie provides the main support
for my argument. The case involved a tort suit in federal court because of diversity of the parties.1 5 The plaintiff had been injured by a
16
passing train while walking alongside a railroad right of way.
Whether the plaintiff could recover depended on whether he was determined to be a trespasser or a licensee. 17 This classification, in
turn, depended on which law applied: Pennsylvania court-created
law 18 or the "general law" of torts as understood by the federal
courts. 19 The Rules of Decision Act 20 called for federal courts to apply
14. Particularly troublesome cases are those in which a court is faced with a jurisdictional element attached to a federal civil cause of action, and the court decides to
treat that element as nonjurisdictional. For discussion ofjurisdictional elements,
see infra Part III.
15. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 69-70.
18. Note, though, that Tompkins, in addition to his other arguments, also claimed
that no rule "had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts."
Id. at 70.
19. Id.
20. 1 Stat. 73, § 34 (1789) (now codified in slightly different form at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1948)).
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the laws of the states in diversity cases, but Swift v. Tyson2l had interpreted "laws" in the Act to mean only statutes, not decisions of
22
state courts.
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, overruled Swift, writing
"[t]here is no federal general common law." 23 The Erie Court (relying
on the research of "a competent scholar" to determine that the Rules of
Decision Act had been misread by the Swift Court)2 4 seemed to feel
uncomfortable overruling a nearly hundred-year-old precedent on this
basis alone. The holding in Erie thus expressly relies on the Constitution, though the Court's language on this point does not specify exactly what part of the Constitution to which it was referring. 25
Commentators have struggled ever since with the exact constitutional
basis for Erie's holding, but some consensus seems to have emerged
that general principles of federalism underlie the case. 26
The language of the decision strongly suggests that federalism is in
fact the constitutional basis of the opinion. Justice Brandeis identified the key problem created by the regime of Swift v. Tyson as follows:
"The federal courts assumed . . .power to declare rules of decision
which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes." 27
This points quite clearly to federalism as the constitutional rationale
21.
22.
23.
24.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
Id. at 18.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
Id. at 72. The "competent scholar" was Charles Warren, in his article New Light
on the History of the Federal JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARv.L. REV. 49 (1923).
Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 n.5.
25. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78 ("[T]he unconstitutionality of the course pursued has
now been made clear ....").
26. Other propositions for the basis of Erie include (1) the Supreme Court's adoption
of positivism over the idea of"a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it." Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(Holmes, J., dissenting)); (2) an equal protection limit on the ability of federal
courts to apply "general common law" to diversity suits; and (3) the understanding that horizontal separation of powers prevents the federal courts from making
law.
The first of these meanings, relating to positivism, of course does not provide a
constitutional foundation. It is well and good that the Erie Court moved away
from mystical understandings of the law, but the decision cannot be said to actually rely on this reasoning.
Second, Justice Brandeis' "equal protection" language in the opinion must be
taken as a rhetorical device. The Fifth Amendment, on which courts today rest
equal protection claims against the federal government, at the time was not considered to include an equal protection component. Bradford R. Clark, Erie's Constitutional Source, 95 CAL.L. REV. 1289, 1299-1300 (2007).
Separation of powers is a newer rationale for Erie. It is, however, a revisionist
theory lacking support in the text of the decision itself. See Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 615-18 (2008).
27. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.
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for the decision. That is, Brandeis's point here was not that federal
courts had enacted laws instead of Congress doing so. Rather, it was
that federal courts were entering jurisdictional territory that Congress had no ability to enter. The reason that Congress had no such
ability was, of course, the federalism restraints of the Constitution. 28
Brandeis also quoted Justice Field's argument in Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. v. Baugh that "[slupervision over either the legislative or the
judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except as to matters by the constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the
United States."29 Finally, in the last line of the third section of the
majority opinion, Brandeis wrote, "We merely declare that in applying
the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several
states." 30 It thus seems rather clear that federalism was the constitutional basis the Court had in mind in 1938.
Later courts and commentators have generally agreed that federalism forms the constitutional basis for Erie. In 1947, the Supreme
Court wrote that Erie's "object and effect were thus to bring federal
judicial power under subjection to state authority in matters essentially of local interest and state control."3 1 Judge Dolores Sloviter of
the Third Circuit has written about her concern that federal judges'
prediction-based diversity decisions "verge[ ] on the lawmaking function of th[e] state court."32 John Hart Ely argued that, while Erie was
"really about several things," its constitutional holding was federalism-based. 33
The federalism rationale for Erie limits federal courts from making
law where Congress cannot reach. A variety of commentators have
made precisely this argument and thus seem to support, if less directly than Sloviter and Ely, the idea that federalism concerns form
28. One could imagine a complaint, consistent with Brandeis' language, that the
courts were making common law in areas that Congress could not reach because
of individual-rights-based limitations as well. This, however, is not what was
happening; the courts were making local contract and property law, not abridging
the freedoms of speech and religion.
29. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893) (Field, J., dissenting)).
30. Id. at 80.
31. U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
32. Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1682 (1992) (emphasis added); see also
Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
JudicialFederalismAfter Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459 (1997) (arguing that "the
federal courts' use of the predictive approach ... raises constitutional concerns of
the sort underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Erie").
33. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 700, 703
(1974) ("W[Erie] was unconstitutional because nothing in the Constitution provided
the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort the Court
had been exercising under Swift.").
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the constitutional basis for Erie.34 Judge Friendly stated in his famous article on Erie and federal common law that it "would
be . .. unreasonable to suppose that the federal courts have a lawmaking power which the federal legislature does not."3 5 George
Rutherglen takes this point further, referring to Erie's argument as
having "the rhetorical force of a reductio ad absurdum. Of course the
power of the federal courts to make law could not exceed the power of
Congress." 3 6 Larry Kramer has argued that federal judicial lawmaking power should be limited even further than Friendly and Rutherglen propose: law creation must be constrained by statutes already
passed by Congress. Kramer's rationale for this limit is the key point:
"the lawmaking power of the federal courts cannot exceed that of the
37
federal government itself."
Finally, Edward Purcell makes an historical argument supporting
this point. He identifies in Erie a specific repudiation of the Supreme
Court's penchant for making law in areas that Congress could not:
insurance contracts had been ruled to be part of the general federal
common law, and thus within reach of the federal courts, but had also
been ruled to be outside Congress's interstate commerce power. Thus,
"[t]he federal judiciary stood as the only branch of the national government empowered to make law covering insurance contracts."3s Erie,
then, may be read as remedying this "disjunction of power."39
While Erie established the absence of a general federal common
law, the Court quickly clarified that there was still room for federal
judicial lawmaking in certain domains. One way federal courts make
law is by construing and applying intentionally vague statutes in
34. Indeed, the Supreme Court has itself hinted at this conclusion. Then-Justice
Rehnquist, quoting Justice Holmes, stated for the Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981), that the Court has "always recognized that federal common
law is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress.'" Id. at 313 (quoting New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)). While that case concerned
whether Congress had preempted the federal common law in the area, this statement by the Court seems to exclude the possibility that the federal courts could
make federal law outside an area that Congress could constitutionally reach. If a
federal court made such irreversible law, that law could hardly be said to be "subject to the paramount authority of Congress." Id.
35. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 395 (1964).
36. George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perilsof Legal Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 285, 287 (1993).
37. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263,
286 (1992).
38. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: Erie,
the Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century
America 55 (2000).
39. Id.
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which Congress has given the courts the power to effectively make
law. The antitrust statutes are perhaps the clearest example of this.40
However, federal courts have also created law despite the lack of a
statute in areas of particular federal importance. The test that the
Supreme Court has articulated to determine when such law should be
created provides further support for the proposition that federalism is
the true basis for the decision in Erie. The first prong in the test for
determining whether federal common law ought to be created to govern a case is whether there is a substantial federal interest in the subject matter at issue in the suit.41 In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States,42 the seminal case on this issue, the Court was faced with a
dispute over how much notice the United States had to give to a payee
bank that a check drawn on the U.S. Treasury had been fraudulently
endorsed and cashed.43 The district court applied state law to the
case, following Erie, and thus held that the United States had unreasonably delayed in giving notice to the bank.44 The bank, therefore,
was not required to reimburse the United States. The court of appeals
reversed, and the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court,
holding that Erie did not apply because "[t]he rights and duties of the
United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law."45 The "substantial federal interest"
test supports a federalism rationale for Erie because it shows that the
concern of the Court in Erie itself was a lack of a substantial federal
interest. That is, the question in Erie was a matter for the state to
decide.
40. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2720
(2007) ("From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute."); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFLCIO, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981) ("In antitrust, the federal courts enjoy more
flexibility and act more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by
federal statute.").
41. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-08 (1988) (finding
a "uniquely federal interest" and a "significant conflict" between state and federal
law).
42. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
43. Id. at 364-65.
44. Id. at 366.
45. Id. While the Court's reasoning on this point is a tad scanty, Paul Mishkin has
argued that the key idea of the doctrine established (thought not elaborated to
the extent it would be in later cases) in Clearfield Trust is that "established federal operation[s]" must be governed by federal law. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799 (1957). Where Congress, for whatever reason, did not create that federal law, the courts must step
in. On this reading the key point is that the law being made in this area is demonstrably within federalism bounds because Congress has created some institution or regime but simply failed to address some aspect of that regime. There is
thus no problem with the federal courts acting in that same area.
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Craig Green has argued that the federalism rationale was invalid
either at the time of the case or now (or both) because of Congress'
near-plenary commerce power.4 6 This argument is unpersuasive.
Federalism principles do create some limits on the power of Congress
to pass laws effective in the states. The exact location of the line
where Congress' enumerated powers stop remains in flux, but the existence of a line cannot be doubted. That no real line exists seems to
form the basis of Green's attack on the federalism rationale for Erie.
He argues that because diversity cases like Erie almost always involve
an effect on interstate commerce, Congress can, in fact, regulate; thus
the premise of the Court's federalism argument is flawed.47 This argument has some force because we ought to keep in mind the practical
effects of whatever constitutional theory we endorse. However,
Green's argument does not go the entire way to discrediting Erie's federalism rationale because he only argues (indeed, can only argue) that
"large numbers" of diversity cases would actually fall within Congress'
commerce power. 48 Thus, he must concede that there are cases to
which Erie's rationale is fully valid. Unfortunately, Erie itself may not
be one of those cases, given that it involves an interstate railroad.
Even so, the point is that there are some things Congress cannot
reach, and to those things, Erie applies fully: the courts cannot create
law to regulate those cases because Congress cannot. 49
Federalism, then, provides a sensible constitutional basis for Erie,
and is consistent with the later jurisprudence arising out of that case.
The federalism rationale for Erie leads, in the next section, to the next
step: federal courts should not be permitted to act where Congress
must refrain from acting because of federalism limitations.
B.

Statutory Interpretation

Because Erie is about federal common law, we tend not to think
about that case's lessons when faced with a question of statutory application. This section shows that this is a mistake. It is not merely
the case that the federal courts cannot "make law" where Congress
cannot, but rather that the courts cannot act at all, whether that ac46. Green, supra note 26, at 611-14.
47. Id. at 612.
48. Id. at 613.

49. While this may not be fully satisfying, it is as far as I need to go to prove my case
here. Recall the main argument: the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited
by the federalism limits the Constitution places on Congress. I am arguing in
this section that Erie supports this thesis because it points out that where Congress is limited by the Constitution from acting, the federal courts have no power,
i.e. that federalism plays a role in limiting the courts' power just as well as it does
Congress'. Thus, the question of how large or small Congress' power is has no
bearing on my thesis, so long as Congress' power is not literally all-encompassing.
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tion takes the form of "making law" or "statutory application."50 A
violation of state sovereignty by a federal court is such a violation
whether undertaken in the context of statutory interpretation or the
making of common law.
To see that Erie's federalism concerns apply equally as well to statutory application as they do to pure lawmaking, consider first a naked
jurisdictional grant that purports to give the federal courts the power
to hear cases that Congress could not regulate (and thus has not regulated) consistent with its enumerated powers. For instance, take a
statute that purports to grant jurisdiction over cases involving "a
51
crime of violence motivated by gender."
Can there be any serious doubt that this grant of jurisdiction
would be unconstitutional? Congress has clearly engaged in an endrun around Article I's limits. The Court held that Congress could not
substantively regulate in the area, so to permit Congress to respond
by granting jurisdiction to the federal courts to create law would effectively render Morrison nugatory. Further, this statute would create a
situation that runs head-on into Erie: the federal courts would be left
making law in an area that Congress could not validly reach under
Morrison.5 2 This kind of naked jurisdictional grant of power to the
courts to regulate an area Congress cannot itself reach is clearly not
53
allowed.
50. The argument here puts to one side the voluminous literature on whether statutory interpretation is or is not lawmaking, or under what circumstances it might
be. See, e.g., Green, supra note 26, at 629 ("As a formal matter, if 'common law'
means anything, it means 'not statutory interpretation."'); Judith S. Kaye, State
Courtsat the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law CourtsReadingStatutes and
Constitutions,70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) ("When the meaning of a statute is
in dispute, there remains at the core the same common-law process of discerning
and applying the purpose of the law."). The location (or even existence) of a line
between these two actions is irrelevant to the argument here. Because my precise point is that Erie applies whether a court is "making law" or "applying a
statute," we need not concern ourselves with what a court is actually doing in a
given situation. All that matters is that the court is somehow acting.
51. This language is, of course, drawn directly from the statute at issue in United
States v. Morrison, which had created a cause of action and granted a right of
recovery to victims of such crimes. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Supreme Court held
that this substantive regulation went beyond Congress' commerce power. Id. at
617.
52. This situation is not exactly like Erie because that case involved the federal
courts' diversity jurisdiction, while here the courts would presumably be exercising their "arising under" jurisdiction. This is a distinction without a difference,
however. In either case, the federal court is quite clearly making federal law
applicable in the states in an area Congress cannot constitutionally reach.
53. This is so even if I accept the theory of protective jurisdiction. While the precise
contours of protective jurisdiction theory are not fully agreed on, one reasonable
definition is given by Eric Segall: "Congress is allowed to 'protect' legitimate Article I concerns by granting jurisdiction to the federal courts even if the law governing the case is nonfederal." Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of Power:
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Suppose now, at the other pole, that Congress passes a highly detailed, fully specified statute that manages to cover every possible contingency, and suppose further that a federal court applies that law to
a situation Congress could not validly reach. Does the fact that the
federal courts will only be "applying" the law to the states rather than
"making law" in the states abrogate the federalism problems with this
scenario? The federal courts would be intruding on the states whether
that intrusion is labeled "making law" or merely "applying law"; the
federal courts would undertake a task that the Constitution entrusted
to the states (by virtue of not entrusting that task to the federal government). This situation violates Erie just as surely as the naked jurisdictional grant situation does. The only distinction between the
two cases is in the court exercising a "creative" function under the naked jurisdictional grant, while its job under the fully specified statute
is mere mechanical application. This distinction makes no difference
in terms of the Erie analysis, however, because as discussed above,
Erie is about federalism, not separation of powers. Were Erie about
the latter, we might care that the federal courts were acting in a creative capacity that is reserved to the legislature; but because of Erie's
federalism rationale, our analysis should focus on whether the federal
54
government is acting beyond its constitutionally granted powers.
The clear unconstitutionality of naked jurisdictional grants to
courts to hear cases outside of Congress' Article I powers is thus
equally as clear as the unconstitutionality of courts acting outside of
Congress' enumerated powers even when applying statutory law. In
sum then, the Erie rationale, that federalism prevents courts from
making common law effective inside the states where Congress could
not have done so, applies equivalently to this other extreme-a fully
specified statute.
If the Erie rationale applies to both extremes, then it certainly
must apply to situations in the middle, where federal statutes actually
fall. In short, the point is that the federal courts' "arising under" jurisdiction piggy-backs on Congress' power. Where Congress can act,
Congress can permit the courts to exercise their "arising under"
power. Where Congress cannot substantively act, it cannot grant such
power. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the
Protective Jurisdiction,Federalismand the Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361
(2002). The key to protective jurisdiction theory is the argument that Congress is
permitted to grant jurisdiction over federal issues, whether or not Congress itself
has regulated substantively in the area. In other words, those who espouse the
theory argue that Congress should be able to grant jurisdiction over areas Congress could regulate but chose not to. The point I have made is that Congress
cannot grant jurisdiction over areas it cannot regulate.
54. Separation of powers, in other words, concerns the character of the action engaged in by the actor. Federalism, by contrast, deals with the subject of that
action.
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United States55 supports this understanding of federal power: "The executive department may constitutionally execute every law which the
Legislature may constitutionally make, and the judicial department
may receive from the Legislature the power of construing every such
law."56
C.

Additional Support

While Erie provides the clearest, most direct support for the idea
that the courts are limited by federalism just as Congress is, additional support can be found in three areas of constitutional structure:
the holistic reading of the admiralty power; the political safeguards of
federalism; and the idea of Congress being able to override federal judicial lawmaking.
1.

Admiralty

The foregoing analysis posits reading federalism limits on Congress' powers into Article III, despite those limits not residing there
textually. This holistic reading of the Constitution's limits on federal
powers-matching one branch's powers in an area to another branch's
despite the relevant constitutional articles not containing explicit text
directing such matching-is not unprecedented, as the Court has held
that Congress has power in the maritime arena despite there being no
admiralty provision in Article I.
Article III contains a provision granting the federal courts jurisdiction over admiralty cases. 5 7 The Supreme Court, despite the lack of
an Article I provision granting Congress power in the area, has read
Article III not only as the jurisdictional grant expressed directly in the
text, but also as an implied grant of substantive power to Congress. In
PanamaRailroad Co. v. Johnson,5 8 the Supreme Court discussed the
Article III grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts:
Although containing no express grant of legislative power over the substantive law, the provision [of Article III] was regarded from the beginning as implicitly investing such power in the United States.... After the Constitution
went into effect, the substantive law theretofore in force was not regarded as
superseded or as being only the law of the several states, but as having become the law of the United States-subject to power in Congress to alter,
qualify or supplement it as experience or changing conditions might require.
When all is considered, therefore, there is no room to doubt that the power of
Congress extends to the entire subject and permits of the exercise of a wide
discretion.59
55. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
56. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
57. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend ...
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . .

58. 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
59. Id. at 386.

to all Cases of
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The Court, in other words, engaged in what I called a holistic reading
of the Constitution, choosing not to view Articles I and III as creating
an asymmetry of power in admiralty. My argument here is essentially
a contrapositive of Panama Railroad. Where the Court decided in
PanamaRailroadthat an express grant of power to the courts implied
a grant of power to Congress, I argue here that a limitation on Congress's power implies the same limitation on the courts' power.
The Court's understanding of the maritime provision in Article III
is not inevitable. The text of the Constitution is consistent with an
understanding that the existing body of maritime law was to be applied by the federal courts and could not be altered by Congress. In
more modern terms, we might understand that the federal courts
would have the power to create a common law of admiralty over which
Congress had no power. Thus, that the Court held that the Article III
power implies a congressional power is significant. It seems to imply
that the Court believed that the federal courts' power, their jurisdiction, could not extend beyond the regulatory power of Congress.
Where the Constitution seemed to create such an extension, the Court
remedied it by divining an implied grant of power to Congress.
This may bring to mind diversity jurisdiction. Article III grants
the federal courts the power to hear cases arising between citizens of
different states, 60 but Article I declines to grant Congress the power to
regulate those cases. The Supreme Court has not treated diversity
like admiralty, so an apparent disjunction of power remains: the federal courts have the power to decide cases (to exercise power) beyond
the limits placed on Congress. While this might, at first blush, appear
to be a nice counterargument to my thesis, closer examination of my
precise argument should dispel this concern. The federal courts can
act in diversity even where Congress cannot precisely because the Constitution gives them the power to do so in that arena. The argument I
have made here is that the Constitution has not granted the Courts
the power to act outside of Congress's power when they exercise their
"arising under ... the Laws of the United States" power. The key is
that, as mentioned before, under this head of jurisdiction, and only
under this head of jurisdiction,the federal courts' power is parasitic
on the power of Congress.
2. PoliticalSafeguards
Herbert Wechsler pointed out in his canonical 1954 article that the
legislative and executive branches, by constitutional design, are com60. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising... between Citizens of different States ....").
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posed of and answerable to the states. 6 1 As a result, the political
branches of the federal government will inherently resist nationalism,
"necessitating the widest support before intrusive measures . . .can
receive significant consideration." 62 Court enforcement of federalism
limits against Congress, then, need not be a high priority. To the extent that the states feel that certain federal measures will encroach on
their sovereignty, Congress, composed of representatives of the states,
will simply not pass that measure. Further, the executive, which is
elected by the states and thus answerable thereto, can veto bills and,
if such veto is overridden, decline to enforce such laws to their full
(sovereignty-violating) extent. Hence, Wechsler wrote, "the Court is
on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states ...."63
By contrast to the political branches, the federal judiciary is almost
completely insulated from state pressures. Once a judge is appointed
and confirmed, the states can exert no more power over her. 6 4 This
lack of political control points to the desirability, or even necessity, of
legal (as distinct from political) measures for keeping the federal
courts within the bounds of federal power set out in the Constitution.
That is, the courts must have some understanding of their limitations
pursuant to their own reading of the Constitution because the States
do not have direct control over the courts in the way that they do over
Congress.
If we are worried about the courts intruding on state sovereignty,
then it may strike some as strange that the solution is a legal rule,
enforceable only by the courts. After all, if the courts are treading on
state toes now, what would stop them from treading on state toes even
after they have been told that federalism limits apply to cut back their
subject matter jurisdiction? The answer is that judicial self-policing
has worked in other contexts. Erwin Chemerinsky has pointed out the
various areas in which "the Court has used federalism to limit federal
judicial power."6 5 Examples include using the Eleventh Amendment
to bar suits against the states in the federal courts, restricting federal
habeas corpus, and limiting the federal courts' power to hear abuse
61. Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The R6le of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954).
62. Id. at 558.
63. Id. at 559.
64. Of course, the President chooses the nominees to the federal bench, and confirmation is done by the Senate, so the states have input about who gets onto the federal bench. However, once those judges have been placed there, they are
insulated.
65. Erwin Chemerinsky, FederalismNot as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1219, 1224 (1997).
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cases against the police.66 Further, Calvin Massey has argued that
the Supreme Court's abstention doctrines, while ostensibly prudential, are really constitutionally based.67 That is, these doctrines are
part of the Court's ongoing task of "monitoring the limits of the federal
68
judicial power."
In other words, Massey and Chemerinsky see the courts as being
perfectly capable of creating and applying doctrines to ensure that federal judicial power is not exercised beyond the realm in which it is
constitutionally permitted, There seems to be no reason, then, why
the courts could not enforce federalism-based jurisdictional limitations as well as they do the abstention doctrines. Further, even if the
courts have never enforced federalism-based limits on themselves,
there is no reason why they should refrain from doing so if such self
limitation furthers the constitutional plan.
3.

CongressionalOverride

The federal courts' nonconstitutional decisions are always subject
to legislative override. 69 If Congress believes that the courts have
misconstrued a federal statute, it can amend the statute to clarify the
matter. 70 If state courts or legislatures believe that federal courts sitting in diversity have misunderstood state law, they can issue decisions or create or amend laws to rectify the situation. 71 However, this
override would be impossible in certain situations if the federal courts'
jurisdiction is not limited by the structural limitations the Constitution explicitly places on Congress.
66. Id. (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987);
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)).
67. Calvin Massey, Abstention and the ConstitutionalLimits of the JudicialPower of
the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811 (1991).
68. Id. at 813.
69. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 100 n.3 (1990) (White, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[In cases ...that involve
statutory interpretation[,] ...Congress is in a position to overrule our decision if
it so chooses."); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)
("[I]n the area of statutory interpretation,... unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains
free to alter what we have done."); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736
(1977) ("[I]n the area of statutory construction, ... Congress is free to change this
Court's interpretation of its legislation.").
70. For a recent example, see the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
11-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 29 and 42 of
the United States Code), which overruled Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
71. See, e.g., Sloviter, supra note 32, at 1679 ("[Tjhe state courts have found fault
with a not insignificant number of past 'Erie guesses' made by the Third Circuit
and our district courts.").
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Take a stylized example. Suppose Congress passes a statute pursuant to its interstate commerce power and includes a clause in the
statute limiting its effect to that conduct with a connection to interstate commerce. 7 2 A federal court hears a case under this statute regarding a party that does not satisfy the jurisdictional element.
However, that party fails to raise the lack of jurisdiction and thus the
court reaches the merits. Suppose that one particular issue in the
larger merits determination could come out with the answer "yes" or
"no," and suppose further that this issue is only relevant to those parties that do not satisfy the jurisdictional element. The federal court
chooses "no." Congress disagrees. What can Congress do about its
disagreement? It cannot write into the statute, "For parties that fall
outside of interstate commerce, the outcome of (the relevant issue)
should be 'yes,"' for that would explicitly violate the Commerce
Clause. Nor can the states control the federal courts in this situation
because the entire question is based on a federal statute. The federal
courts, then, stand alone. Outside of constitutional interpretation,
73
this situation ought to be intolerable.
Thus, the bilateral reading of Article III's admiralty provision, the
lack of political safeguards of federalism on the federal courts, and the
potential nonexistence of legislative overrides of court activity all support ensuring that federal judicial power is not intended to reach beyond federal legislative power. Thus, the federalism-based limitations
on legislative power must apply equally to federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.
III.

STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS ARE JURISDICTIONAL

In the discussion thus far, I have sought to show that federalism
limitations on the federal government are also limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This Part addresses the question of how
to best enforce that limitation. This Part turns from a largely theoretical approach to more functional questions-particularly in light of
the fact that the constitutional issue discussed in Part II has great
practical relevance to the way courts treat commerce-based "jurisdic74
tional elements," an important part of many federal statutes.
72. For more on these "jurisdictional elements," see infra Part II.
73. It must be admitted that it is difficult to think of a real-life situation that satisfies
the broad outlines sketched here. The reason, however, lies not in the example I
have given, but with the extraordinarily broad reading of the constitutional
grants of federal power since the New Deal, even taking into account recent
retrenchment.
74. See Tara M. Stuckey, Note, JurisdictionalHooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly InterpretingFederal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L.

REV. 2101, 2103-04 (2006) (discussing the widespread use of jurisdictional elements to link federal statutes to interstate commerce).
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The phrase "jurisdictional element" has been used by courts to describe links between Congress' power to enact a statute and the reach
of that statute. For instance, in United States v. Lopez, 75 the Supreme
Court faulted Congress for not including such an element in the Guns
Free School Zones Act, thus permitting prosecutions under that act to
exceed Congress' enumerated powers.76 Many federal criminal statutes already contain elements of this type. The Hobbs Act, for example, criminalizes "obstruct[ing], delay[ing], or affect[ing] commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspir[acy] so to do."77 Some civil statutes
also contain such elements, including Title VII and the antitrust laws.
In the former, the jurisdictional element is contained in the definition
of "employer": an employer is not covered by Title VII unless it is "engaged in an industry affecting commerce." 78 The antitrust statute
states, inter alia, that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal."79 Before I address the question of how to treat these jurisdictional elements, some background on the distinction between jurisdiction and merits is necessary.
A.

Jurisdiction and Merits

Subject matter jurisdiction is about the power to decide cases.8 0
Because the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, determinations of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case are of the utmost importance. For a court to act without
jurisdiction is "to act ultra vires."81 The result of this structural feature of the federal system is that challenges to a court's jurisdiction
are treated differently in a number of respects from merits-based challenges. Subject-matter jurisdiction challenges cannot be waivedS2 and
thus can be raised at any time. This includes the possibility of challenging jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. Further, even if a
party does not raise the issue, federal courts should raise jurisdic75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 561.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004) ("[Slubject-matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to
which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.").
81. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
82. See, e.g., U.S. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) ("[Slubject-matter jurisdiction,
because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
waived.").
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tional issues sua sponte.8 3 Finally, courts must assure themselves
that they have subject matter jurisdiction over a case before they address any merits issues.S4 Issues that do not concern subject-matter
jurisdiction, which are generally "merits" issues, do not have these
features.
The scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction is important because of its great degree of influence on the overall relationship between federal and state power, a core topic of the Constitution.
Broader federal jurisdiction results in less room for the exercise of
state power, not only in terms of individual cases, but also in terms of
the development of law. Cases in state courts often include federal
issues, and cases in federal courts often include state issues. To the
extent that federal courts exercise more or less jurisdiction, they also
exercise more or less control over the development of state common
5
law.8
However, individual litigants will generally have no reason to be
concerned with this balance of power: their overriding concern is to
win their case. This explains why we permit courts to raise a subject
matter jurisdiction issue sua sponte: the parties may have little incentive to do so because the issue does not in the end concern them, but
the failure to address the issue at all could result in a misalignment of
state and federal power. This also helps explain why we permit parties to raise jurisdictional issues at any time: it maximizes the likelihood that the jurisdictional issues will be raised at some point and
resolved correctly. Allowing a party to raise a jurisdictional issue any
time interferes with finality, but finality is mostly an individual value:
a winning party can rest easy knowing that it cannot be hauled into
court on this issue again. As an individual concern then, finality is
subjugated to increasing the odds that we get the federal-state balance right.
This subjugation of personal rights to structural concerns results
in the different treatment of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
While both issues concern the power of the court to decide a case, the
former regards individual rights.8 6 As such, personal jurisdiction issues can be waived, and we do not permit courts to raise personal ju83. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) ("[Clourts, including
this Court, have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.").
84. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93-94.
85. By "common law" I mean both traditional common law and the gloss that courts
put on statutes.
86. To the extent that there are any structural issues implicated by personal jurisdiction, they reflect the balance of power between the states, not between the federal
government and the states.
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risdiction questions on their own.8 7 Further, there is no question
about misalignment of incentives when the right is individual: vindicating one's individual rights is perfectly aligned with winning a case.
Thus, there are important differences between issues going to subject matter jurisdiction and merits issues. However, discerning
whether a particular issue fits into one category or the other has confounded courts and scholars. The problem comes in distinguishing between a requirement that must be met in order for a court to take
jurisdiction of a case, and a requirement that must be met in order for
a party to state or win a claim. In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., for instance, the Supreme Court considered whether the portion of the definition of "employer" in Title VII that requires the putative employer to
have fifteen or more employees 8 8 was jurisdictional. The Court decided that it was not, thus holding that it is an element of a plaintiffs
substantive claim, not a prerequisite for the exercise of judicial
power. 8 9 Similarly, Reasor, the case discussed in Part I, held that the
interstate commerce element of the securities fraud statute was not
jurisdictional. 90 These cases determine whether the relevant issue
can be waived by the party that has the burden of raising it, whether
the court can raise the issue sua sponte, and whether the issue must
be addressed before others.
The reason cases like Reasor are difficult is because of the obvious
relation to limits on power that commerce-based jurisdictional elements bear. Congress has put these elements in the statutes to ensure that federal power is not overreached. In that sense, the
elements look "jurisdictional" because they are about the power of the
federal government. On the other hand, the elements are contained in
substantive statutes, sometimes placed in the definitions of relevant
actors, as in Title VII. In this respect, the jurisdictional elements look
no different from any other requirement or limitation in any substantive statute: the plaintiff must prove these elements in order to win its
case.
Arbaugh proposed a remarkably simple solution to this complicated problem. The Arbaugh Court created a bright-line rule based on
clear congressional statements:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's
scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress
87. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.").
88. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) ("The term 'employer'
means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees . .

").

89. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515.
90. United States v. Reasor, 418 F.3d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 2005).
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does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. 9 1

This is a sensible rule for statutory elements that are unrelated to the
limits on federal power. The remainder of this Part, however, shows
that a different approach is required by "true" jurisdictional elements,
those that exist to keep a statute within the bounds of Congress's pow92
ers under the Constitution.
91. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16 (footnote and citation omitted). The actual force of
this bright-line rule remains unclear. Little more than a year after Arbaugh, a
five-justice majority proceeded to completely ignore it. In Bowles v. Russell, 551
U.S. 205 (2007), Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that the time limit for filing
an appeal was jurisdictional. Id. at 214 ("Today we make clear that the timely
filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement."). The
case concerned 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), which permits a district court, on certain conditions and within certain time limits, to "reopen the time for appeal for a period
of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal." This
fourteen-day period is what the Court held to be jurisdictional despite no language in the statute indicating Congress' intent to label it as such, as would seem
to be required by the Arbaugh test. Justice Thomas dismissed Arbaugh with a
single sentence, however, writing, "In Arbaugh, the statutory limitation was an
employee-numerosity requirement, not a time limit." Id. at 211. Justice Ginsburg, the author of Arbaugh, joined Justice Souter's dissent, which relied on that
case. Id. at 215 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92. Despite the attention paid to them, the issue here neither begins nor ends with
jurisdictional elements. First, a jurisdictional element may or may not actually
be a constitutionally imposed limit on the federal courts' jurisdiction. To the extent that the element is not such a limit, the argument presented here does not
apply. Second, challenges based on jurisdictional elements are not the only ones
that can be raised.
As to the first point, Congress has a great variety of language to choose from
in creating a jurisdictional element. The statutes discussed above illustrate some
of this variety. Title VII covers employers "engaged in an industry affecting commerce," while the portion of the antitrust statute cited above covers contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies "in restraint of trade or commerce." Some of
these jurisdictional elements will indicate that Congress intended to reach every
possible behavior that it could under the Commerce Clause, while others could
possibly represent a policy choice on Congress' part to not reach as far as its
commerce power would permit. If a party raises an issue based on a jurisdictional element that fits into the latter category, the challenge is not (necessarily)
properly called jurisdictional because it has nothing to do with the legitimate
reach of Congress and the courts.
The second point is that challenges based on jurisdictional elements are not
the only type contemplated by my argument in this Article. Any time a party
raises a federalism-based issue going to Congress' power to regulate, whether a
facial challenge or as-applied to that party's situation, the courts should treat the
issue as jurisdictional. The point here, remember, is that federalism limits on
Congress' power are also limits on the courts' power. Thus, if a party argues that
Congress has gone beyond its authority in creating a statute based on Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that party is simultaneously (impliedly) arguing
that for the federal court to exercise jurisdiction over the case would also violate
the Constitution. It is thus a challenge to the court's jurisdiction, and must be
accorded the treatment discussed in section III.A. Namely, it cannot be regarded
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The Prevailing Opinion on Jurisdictional Elements

In recent years, the courts of appeals have generally treated jurisdictional elements in federal criminal statutes as nonjurisdictional.93
Unfortunately, these courts have generally opted for mere assertions
of the result in place of actual reasoning or examination of the problem. The Seventh Circuit, for instance, held that the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) is not jurisdictional, with no further
argument than a citation to the Steel Co. case. 94 The portion of Steel
Co. to which the Seventh Circuit refers, however, merely sets out the
background of the law of jurisdiction and merits, including the fact
that failure to state a cause of action does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction.95 With only a little critical analysis, one should realize
that this statement does not answer the question of whether the jurisdictional element of the federal crime in question goes to the "cause of
action" (really, in this situation, the crime) or the jurisdiction of the
court. Steel Co. merely says that there is a difference between jurisdiction and merits, which is unobjectionable. It provides little information on where to draw the line.
Other opinions have moved from this relatively harmless lack of
reasoning to full-blown incomprehensibility. In United States v. Rea,
the Eighth Circuit "point[ed] out that [the statute's] 'interstate commerce' requirement, while jurisdictional in nature, is merely an element of the offense, not a prerequisite to subject matter
jurisdiction."96 The Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh undercuts
the idea that anything could be "jurisdictional in nature" by tying jurisdiction to congressional intent. 9 7 An element could not be "jurisdictional in nature" if Congress can either make that element
jurisdictional or not. The only reason we might call a statutory element "jurisdictional in nature" is that the element is jurisdictional regardless of what Congress intended. Because the Constitution
provides the only sensible basis for overriding congressional intent in
this way, if the interstate commerce element really is "jurisdictional in

93.

94.
95.
96.
97.

as waived at any time and it must be addressed by the court even if the parties do
not raise it.
See, e.g., United States v. Reasor, 418 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 657
(5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rea, 169 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1999); Hugi v.
United States, 164 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d
529 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 1993).
Martin, 147 F.3d at 532.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89-91 (1998).
Rea, 169 F.3d at 1113.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006); see also Evan Tsen Lee,
The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction,54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613 (2003) (arguing that
there is no "true concept" of jurisdiction).
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nature," then that necessarily means that the interstate commerce element also is "a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction."
Although the Fifth Circuit has failed to engage in a rigorous analysis, it has gone so far as to state that "the Commerce Clause, found in
Article I of the United States Constitution, implies limits on the power
of Congress to regulate, not on the Article III federal courts' power to
adjudicate." 98 This, of course, is precisely the opposite of what I am
arguing here: federalism limits, such as the Commerce Clause, do, in
fact, limit the federal courts' power. As support for its proposition, the
court wrote a footnote, the entire text of which reads: "It is the courts
that have the power to determine whether Congress has exceeded the
powers granted it under the Commerce Clause. 'It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.'
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)."99 It seems as if
the Fifth Circuit is worried that if the courts do not have jurisdiction
to hear cases falling outside of the commerce power, then they will
never be able to validly rule that Congress has acted outside that
power. The solution to this puzzle lies in the courts' jurisdiction to
determine their jurisdiction, which courts always have.1 0 0 A federal
court will not know at the beginning of a case whether it has jurisdiction. It will have to resolve the constitutional issue in order to determine this question, and it has jurisdiction to do so. Thus, a ruling that
Congress has exceeded its commerce power is still a valid exercise of
power even if the courts have no jurisdiction over cases outside the
commerce power. The Fifth Circuit's support for its position that the
Commerce Clause does not limit the courts is not compelling.
Howard Wasserman has argued, in agreement with the Fifth Circuit, that jurisdictional elements are not about the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts. To Wasserman, "[j]urisdictional elements are
about congressional jurisdiction" and "have nothing to do with judicial
jurisdiction."lol He points out that the Supreme Court struck down
the act in question in United States v. Morrison for (in part) its failure
to include a jurisdictional element. Wasserman states that "[tihe basic point underlying Morrison was that Congress lacked substantive
98. Reasor, 418 F.3d at 469.
99. Id. at 469 n.5.
100. See, e.g., Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1026 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A
court always has jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction .... "); Stoll v. Gottlieb,

101.

305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938) ("There must be admitted ... a power to interpret the
language of the jurisdictional instrument and its application to an issue before
the court."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. c (1982)
("Whether a court whose jurisdiction has been invoked has subject matter jurisdiction of the action is a legal question that may be raised by a party to the action
or by the court itself. When the question is duly raised, the court has the authority to decide it.... Thus, a court has authority to determine its own authority, or
as it is sometimes put, 'jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction.'").
Wasserman, supra note 2, at 684.
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power to enact VAWA."102 He believes that the "failure to establish a
true jurisdictional element . . .means only that the statute by its
terms does not reach the real-world actors and conduct at issue in that
case." 103 This argument is based on the idea that jurisdictional elements may not reflect constitutional limits at all, but rather congressional choice: "If every statutory element reflects legislative choice,
there is no justification for treating one choice ... as jurisdictional
while treating all the other choices ... as merits-based."104
Wasserman's argument about Morrison is true enough. The Morrison Court there was concerned with the lack of a jurisdictional element because jurisdictional elements can establish the facial validity
of federal statutes. This, however, only scratches the surface of the
purpose of jurisdictional elements. Their existence in a statute prevents conduct falling outside the relevant enumerated power from being caught up in the congressional regulation. To focus only on the
facial constitutionality aspect of jurisdictional elements is
shortsighted.
The problem with Wasserman's argument about statutory elements being pure legislative choice is that it is not obviously true.
Can it really be said that all commerce-based statutory elements reflect simple legislative choice, that the constitutional limits on Congress's power do not drive the decision to include these jurisdictional
elements? This seems implausible.10 5 Wasserman seems to have
been led astray by the employee-numerosity requirement in Title VII.
He sets out the case that this element, requiring that an employer
have fifteen or more employees in order to be covered by the statute, is
not related to Congress's commerce power, and he is indubitably right
on this point. The problem is that his argument does not apply to elements that actually invoke commerce, like the portion of Title VII discussed above. These elements simply stand on different ground than
the employee-numerosity requirement, and thus require a different
analysis.
The prevailing opinion is that jurisdictional elements, despite the
name, 106 are not jurisdictional.10 7 The import of the argument in
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 685.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 691.
Further, my argument is constrained by the notion that jurisdictional elements
should be jurisdictional to the extent that they actually reflect constitutionallimits
on Congress.
106. Judge Easterbrook has referred to the phrase "jurisdictional element" as a "colloquialism." Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1999).
107. There is at least one dissenting opinion on this issue. See Alex Lees, Note, The
JurisdictionalLabel: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN.L. REV. 1457 (2006). Lees argues
that "if a rule operates to shift authority from one law-speaking institution to
another[,] ...then the rule can justifiably be treated rigidly." Id. at 1460. This
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Part II is that these unreasoned or poorly reasoned cases are wrong:
because of the federalism concerns expressed in Erie, courts should
consider their power to be limited by the structural limitations on
Congress. Thus, to the extent that jurisdictional elements are expressive of such structural limitations, they ought to be respected as jurisdictional by the courts and viewed as limiting the power of the courts.
C.

Why Jurisdictional Elements Should Be Jurisdictional

The Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh does little to resolve the
jurisdiction versus merits difficulty. As previously discussed, the
Court was faced with the employee-numerosity requirement of Title
VII. This element is not what I would call a "true" jurisdictional element, in that employer size has nothing to do with keeping the statute
within the constitutional limits on federal power. The Court's brightline rule, however, would seem to apply with full force to "true" jurisdictional elements as well as to the kinds of elements the Court actually had before it in the case.' 0 8 For example, because the commerce
element in Title VII is not plainly stated by Congress to be jurisdictional, it will not be considered by the federal courts to be a limit on
their subject matter jurisdiction.
Suppose that, paralleling the events of Arbaugh, a lawyer makes a
mistake in the following way: an employee sues her employer for violating Title VII, but the employer is not engaged in an industry that
affects commerce. Lulled by the last seventy years of commerce jurisprudence into believing that Congress' power to regulate under the
commerce clause is plenary, the employer's lawyer does not bother to
make a challenge based on the commerce element. There is a trial,
the plaintiff-employee wins, and judgment for tens of thousands of dollars of backpay is entered. On appeal, the lawyer, somewhat desperate, decides for the first time to argue the interstate commerce issue.
The court of appeals, following the bright-line rule of Arbaugh, tells
the employer, "Too bad. We would have found for your client because
it really is acting entirely outside of interstate commerce, but the commerce element in Title VII is not a limit on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, so you waived the issue by not raising it."
argument is related to my own, and might have the same outcomes in terms of
what kind of rules and arguments are treated as jurisdictional, but it is oddly
divorced from constitutional understandings of jurisdiction, focusing instead on
the characteristics (such as rigidity) of jurisdictional doctrines.
108. A number of lower courts have, in fact, applied the Arbaugh rule to "true" jurisdictional elements. See, e.g., Branham v. Halsted Home Rental, LLC, 2008 WL
1745825 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2008) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Daniel v. Pizza
Zone Italian Grill & Sports Bar, Inc., 2008 WL 793660 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2008)
(same); Jiang v. Lee's Happy House, 2008 WL 706529 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2008)
(same); O'Donald v. Yost, 2006 WL 2345947 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2006) (federal
bank robbery statute).
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From the perspective of the argument I have made here, this outcome is untenable. The district court, in entertaining the lawsuit, in
forcing the defendant to withstand a trial, in entering a judgment for
thousands of dollars, has acted in a realm Congress has no power to
touch. The Court has exercised power over the defendant and ultimately sanctioned the defendant for conduct that Congress could not
validly outlaw.
This violation of the plan of the Constitution comes about because
one lawyer forgot to raise a relevant defense. If the issue at stake
were a personal right, there would be no problem: the employer chose
its lawyer, and the lawyer, as the employer's agent, acted carelessly.
One lives with the consequences of one's actions, and the employer
thus more or less voluntarily waived its personal right. Federalism
and the commerce clause, though, have nothing to do with the employer, but rather concern the large-scale issue of whose right it is to
regulate all such purely intrastate employers. This issue does not belong to the employer to waive: rights can be waived, but federalism
grants the employer no rights; no one has a positive duty toward the
employer vis-A-vis federalism.
Furthermore, through the lens of political safeguards, we can see
Title VII's jurisdictional element as the result of state actors in the
federal government desiring to not intrude on the states. Leaving the
enforcement of that limit in the hands of the litigants could neuter
this exercise of state political power. Individual litigants have no reason to care particularly about federalism-they merely want to win
their case.10 9
There are, then, two options. We can either do what the court of
appeals did in this hypothetical and say "too bad" to the idea of enforcing the Constitution, or we can make these limits jurisdictional, which
will allow mistakes such as this to be corrected. The choice ought to
be clear.
Throwing out jury verdicts and vacating judgments sounds terrible, of course. Courts waste time and money dealing with issues they
never should have dealt with. Further, we might be concerned that
difficult jurisdictional issues will clog up the courts, causing additional time and money to be lost when easier, merits-based ways of
disposing of cases are available. We have to remember, however, the
value that we place on striking the correct structural balance between
109. It might well be the case that defendants' interests typically line up with state
interests because federalism limits will usually limit the application of a statute
on which a plaintiff relies to get relief. Even so, as mentioned above, individuals
can make mistakes. Further, it may not be the case that a particular group of
parties is always aligned with the states' interests. Because we are speaking
about constitutional structural issues, absolute guarantees are more valuable
than situations where we get it right most of the time.
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the federal government and the states. We have a Constitution that
we have chosen to treat not as advisory, or as just another law, but as
supreme law, forcing everything in the system to conform. Hypothetical expense at a non-catastrophic level should not prevent us from enforcing the constitutional plan to the utmost.1 1 0
In addition, the cost complaints are likely overblown. First,
nonwaivability is not the only characteristic of jurisdictional limits.
Courts also have the power and the duty to raise jurisdictional issues
sua sponte. If every court treated the commerce element as jurisdictional in the situation imagined above, the court of appeals never
would have become involved; the district court would have investigated the jurisdictional issue before the case ever got as far as jury
trial and judgment. Second, while certain jurisdictional issues may
look difficult now in comparison to merits issues, the nature of a common law system is that those issues will become easier over time as a
body of law is built on which courts can draw.
The federal courts, then, in order to better enforce constitutional
limits on federal power, and to better respect the will of the states,
ought to treat structural challenges as jurisdictional.
IV.

COUNTERARGUMENTS

Having established that the federal courts are limited by federalism limits on Congress's power, and having argued that this limit
should be applied by making issues raising federalism questions jurisdictional in the federal courts, this Part addresses three counterarguments that have not been raised in the discussion to this point.
A. Arbaugh
Arbaugh's bright-line rule obviously cuts against the argument I
have made here. However, the reasons the Court gave for that rule,
even if they support the rule as applied to statutory elements of a nonconstitutional nature, do not support applying the rule to "true" jurisdictional elements.
The Court's first concern in Arbaugh was with the fact that courts
can and must raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte: "Nothing in the
text of Title VII indicates that Congress intended courts, on their own
motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity requirement is
met.""' This is true, and it may well be an excellent reason not to
consider the employee-numerosity requirement to be jurisdictional. It
110. Steel Co. supports this idea by holding that jurisdiction must be determined
before merits issues, even where those merits issues are easier (and thus less
expensive) to resolve. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,
93-94 (1998).
111. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
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does not, however, support the broader rule when that rule is applied
to issues of constitutional dimension. That is, when it comes to limits
on federal power, Congress' intent does not matter if it conflicts with
constitutional mandates.
Second, the Court cited "unfairness" and "waste of judicial resources" as reasons for not holding the employee-numerosity requirement to be jurisdictional.11 2 The facts of the case before the Court are
key to understanding these rationales. In Arbaugh, the plaintiff had
sued her employer and won a jury verdict before the employer raised
the argument that it did not have fifteen employees.11 3 While one can
debate the fairness point,114 the "waste of judicial resources" point is
closer to the mark: if the judgment is thrown out, then a trial will have
been had for nought. However, as I pointed out in section III.C, the
cost complaint should not be permitted to override our desire to ensure that the proper structure of our government is maintained.
In sum, while Arbaugh's analytical failings are different from those
presented by the courts of appeals in earlier cases,1 15 they are failings
nonetheless. Arbaugh presents no viable counterargument to the theory presented here.
B.

Floodgates

One might worry that this argument will open the constitutional
floodgates on the courts. Because federal courts must address jurisdictional issues first, before any merits issues, 1 16 if constitutional issues are treated as jurisdictional, the courts will be overwhelmed by
having to decide issues that they might otherwise avoid.
This argument provides an opportunity to re-emphasize one point:
I do not argue here that all constitutional challenges should be jurisdictional. Rather, I argue only that, following Erie, federalism-based
challenges should be jurisdictional. If the government attempts to
prosecute a citizen for engaging in protected speech, the defendant's
first amendment argument will not be jurisdictional: the first amendment protects an individual right. It has nothing to do with the balance of power between the states and the federal government. By
contrast, a commerce clause-based argument would be jurisdictional,
as would a question about whether Congress had exceeded its power
7
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."l
112. Id. at 515.
113. Id. at 507-09.
114. That is, is it more fair to subject a defendant employer to liability where Congress
intended there to be none, or to take away a judgment from the plaintiff?
115. See supra section II.B.
116. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998).
117. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." It grants
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This individual/structural distinction is not new. Recall the discussion above of the difference between subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is a structural issue, regarding the proper division of power between the states
and the federal government, while personal jurisdiction is individual
and involves one's right not to be hauled into distant fora. The concept of limited subject matter jurisdiction is one expression of the
larger idea of federalism; other expressions of federalism in the Constitution, such as limited congressional power, are structural just as
subject matter jurisdiction is. By contrast, other protections in the
Constitution, such as freedom of speech or freedom from unreasonable
searches, are individual. Thus it makes sense to treat Commerce
Clause-based challenges as going to subject matter jurisdiction while
still calling free speech challenges, for instance, nonjurisdictional.
C.

State Courts vs. Federal Courts

Finally, the specter of federal-claim litigation in state court may
worry some: issues treated as jurisdictional in federal court do not demand similar treatment in state court. Only the federal courts are
limited by federalism doctrines. This presents an asymmetry that
may seem odd.
That asymmetry, though, is completely natural: state courts and
federal courts are different beasts. The Constitution affects these
courts in different ways. They have different places in our governmental structure. Should we really be surprised that they might treat
certain issues differently? Suppose, following Arbaugh, Congress
amended Title VII to make the fifteen-employee limitation jurisdictional. Would we also say that this element now limits the jurisdiction
of the state courts? This could not be right: Congress has no power
over the state courts' jurisdiction. Those courts could, if they wanted,
treat this element as a limitation on their jurisdiction, but it would be
a pure state decision. Yet the federal courts would have to treat the
element as a limit on their jurisdiction. Thus, this differential treatment in state courts of issues that I claim are jurisdictional should not
bother us.
V.

CONCLUSION

The argument I have presented here, that federalism-related issues should be treated as limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts, and, in particular, that commerce-based jurisdictional elements ("true" jurisdictional elements) should be treated as
jurisdictional, is not, by some measures, especially radical. The theory
Congress positive power that, prior to the enactment of the amendment, it had
not held, and thus affects the federal-state balance.
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here arises, I have argued, from Erie, one of American law's most
venerable cases. It is consistent with the way the Supreme Court
treated constitutional structure in Steel Co. There is apparently only
one Supreme Court case that flies in the face of my argument:
Arbaugh. Even in Arbaugh, the bright-line rule can be dismissed as
dicta because the Court did not have before it a "true" jurisdictional
element, but only a policy-based limit on the application of Title VII.
Certainly, a passel of lower-court cases have held precisely the opposite of what I argue here, but, as I have shown, those cases present
little in the way of coherent argument for their position. In short, the
Supreme Court could impose the rule that "true" jurisdictional elements create limits on federal subject matter jurisdiction with little
upheaval, but to great gain in the consistent implementation of our
federal Constitution.

